Get-RBCD-Threaded

Discovering Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) attack pathways in Active Directory setups is the goal of the Get-RBCD-Threaded tool. This tool aids in the identification of possible targets for RBCD attacks, which take use of Kerberos limited delegation settings.

The Get-RBCD-Threaded tool is specifically created for identifying Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) attack paths within Active Directory environments. RBCD is an attack technique that exploits Kerberos constrained delegation settings, and this tool aids in recognizing potential targets susceptible to such attacks. It serves as a valuable resource for security professionals and administrators seeking to understand and mitigate the risks associated with RBCD vulnerabilities.

How it Works

· The tool queries Active Directory for all users,groups (excluding privileged groups like "Domain Admins" and"BUILTIN\Administrators"), and computer objects in the currentdomain.

· It compiles a list of their Security Identifiers(SIDs).

· It then queries Active Directory for allDiscretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) on computer objects in the domain.

· Each Access Control Entry (ACE) in the DACLs ischecked to see if any user/group/computer SIDs have specific privileges like"GenericAll," "GenericWrite," "WriteOwner," or"WriteDacl" on the computer object.

· It also checks if the SIDs have"WriteProp" permissions on the ms-DS-Allowed-To-Act-On-Behalf-Of-Other-Identityattribute (GUID: 3f78c3e5-f79a-46bd-a0b8-9d18116ddc79).

· If such privileges are found, it indicates apotential Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack path.

Usage

Compile in Visual Studio. The tool utilizes Parallel.ForEachfor faster searching through DACL objects, requiring .NET v4 as a minimum.

Options include specifying a username, password, domain,searching forests, filtering based on pwdLastSet, forcing insecure LDAPconnection, specifying an output file, and more.

Example Usage

 

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Detections

  • The     tool performs LDAP queries, which might not be easily detectable.     Detection methods could involve monitoring for large numbers of LDAP     queries or unusual traffic to a system.
  • Honeypot     accounts can be used for detection by monitoring modifications to the     honeypot computer object, especially to the msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity     property. Also, monitor for Kerberos tickets requested for services on the     honeypot computer object.

 

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